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A large range of problems within the EU can be thought of as arising from 
the separation of the relevant population into two groups: the included and the 
excluded. There are obvious examples, such as the employed and the 
unemployed, poor regions and rich regions, poor and rich areas of the same city, 
single parents without access to child care and two-income households. Of 
course, in practice the two blend into each other at the margins, but it is helpful to 
keep them conceptually distinct.
More generally, the distinction between the excluded and included groups 
can operate in one or more of three dimensions. The social dimension, embracing 
questions of class, gender and race; the spatial dimension, covering the 
geographic aspect of prosperity; and the structural dimension of the distinction 
between the macro, meso and micro levels.
The concept of social exclusion embraces a wide range of apparently 
unrelated examples. The spatial exclusion, for example, of the poorer areas of a 
city at first sight has little in common with, say, the social exclusion of ethnic 
minority groups.
But there are three stylised facts which emerge from many of these 
seemingly disparate areas, including that of unemployment:
i) there is a marked tendency for exclusion, once it arises, to persist for 
long periods of time. At the extreme, for example, the areas of Manchester noted 
by Engels [1] in the 1840s as suffering the most acute deprivation have scarcely 
changed in their relative status over a period of 150 years, with many of them 
remaining the poorest parts of the city today. Of course, not every example of 
social exclusion persists for such a long period of time, but, once established, 
patterns of behaviour are difficult to change.
ii) as a corollary of point (i), self-equilibrating mechanisms beloved of 
conventional economics appear to be weak in the context of social exclusion.
In economic theory, for example, imbalances between supply and demand 
are corrected by movements in the price of the product in question. The system 
contains negative feedback, in that the system operates to dampen rather than to 
amplify any disturbances which might occur. Yet in the labour market, following 
the sharp upward rise in unemployment in the early 1980s, in countries of the EU 



























































































Unemployement and Social Exclusion: An Economic View
exception being (West) Germany, where even here unemployment has persisted 
at historically high levels for the same length of time.
Over very long periods of time, non-trivial unemployment rates have 
persisted in the Western economies. For example, over the last 140 years - the 
longest period for which data of any remote degree of reliability exist - the 
unemployment rate in Britain has averaged 5 per cent. In the peace time years 
this century, unemployment has averaged 6 per cent in the United States. Even in 
Germany, the peace time years since 1920 have seen an average unemployment 
rate of over 4 per cent, whilst in Belgium the figure is almost 6 per cent. These 
may seem small percentages, but they represent many millions of individuals - in 
today's terms, for example, the US unemployment rate mentioned above amounts 
to 8 million people.
Kenneth Arrow [2], who placed free market economic theory onto a 
modem mathematical basis in the early 1950s, has recently stated that he now 
regards general equilibrium theory in economics as being empirically falsified, 
with the single most important fact being the failure of labour markets to clear 
over long periods of time.
iii) there is a widespread failure of conventional policies of targeting 
public resources on specific exclusion problems to bring about a permanent 
improvement in the relative position of the excluded group. This is not, of 
course, to say that such policies never have beneficial results. But there are many 
examples of conventional policy failure.
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss European unemployment from 
this general perspective, and to propose ways in which the problem might be 
tackled in the context of a new social contract.
2. Unemployment in Europe: the evidence
The long-run persistence of European unemployment, and the implied 
failure of conventional policies to solve the problem, can be seen very clearly 
using graphs. The conventional way of doing this in economics is to plot the 
series over time. Chart 1 does this, showing the unemployment rate in Belgium ( 
using OECD data throughout) from 1960 to 1994. Unemployment was very low 
from 1960 to 1973, rose sharply to the early 1980s, and since then has fluctuated 





























































































An alternative way is to use a connected scatter plot, which is widely used 
in non-linear systems analysis. Chart 2 constructs a scatter plot of unemployment 
in Belgium in any particular year against unemployment in the previous year. 
The resulting points are then connected together in sequence. Such charts can 
provide three technical pieces of information. First, whether the data tends to 
exhibit cycles over time. If so, the data in a connected scatter plot will appear in 
the shape of an ellipse. Second, the average value around which the series 
fluctuates. This is the point in the centre of any ellipse which, applying technical 
jargon, we can call the attractor point of the data. The data in the series is 
attracted around this point. Third, the chart shows the magnitude of the cycles 
around the attractor point. An ellipse which was very tightly drawn, for example, 
would imply that the data showed only small fluctuations over time.
The sequence of points in the bottom left of the chart show the economic 
cycles in the 1960s and early 1970s. Unemployment showed only small 
fluctuations around a low average. There was then a large, continuous rise until 
the peak of 1982, but since then a new pattern has been established, of large 
fluctuations around a high average level.
The connected scatter plot of unemployment in Belgium reveals a pattern 
which is qualitatively similar in a majority of the countries of the EU. For 
interest, Charts 3 and 4 show ( W est) German and British unemployment, but the 
pattern is typical of countries such as the Netherlands, Italy, Denmark and 
Austria. France and Spain exhibit different behaviour in that unemployment rose 
more or less continuously from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, but since then 
the same pattern of large fluctuations around a high level attractor point has 
become established in both these countries. Chart 5 plots the connected scatter 
plot of unemployment in France.
In general, the behaviour of unemployment in Europe over time is 
characterised by two features. First, the existence of reasonably regular cycles of 
similar amplitude which can persist for considerable periods of time. Second, 
abrupt shifts away from any given attractor point of the cycles, followed by a 
short period of time before a new attractor point emerges, which itself then 
persists with no self-regulating factors moving it back to its initial position. In 
other words, the average rate of unemployment is moved sharply up or down by 
major shocks to the economy, but once the shift has occurred, the new average 




























































































Unemployement and Social Exclusion: An Economic View
3. A theoretical approach to social exclusion
A theoretical model must be able to account for the key stylised facts of 
persistence of exclusion and of the widespread failure of conventional policies to 
solve such problems. Such an analytical framework is in fact available, which 
generalises the principles of the amplification of disturbances through positive 
feedback and 'lock-in' which have been developed in recent years in the areas of 
the choice of technology and of the regional location of industry.
The sources of persistence, and the consequent difficulty of altering the 
relative position of the excluded by targeted expenditure, are increasing returns 
through positive feedback. This latter term is used here not in a normative sense, 
but in its technical sense of meaning that the dynamic processes at work re­
inforce each other, and lock the system strongly into whatever direction it is 
moving. The original insights into increasing returns and the choice of 
technology were provided by Brian Arthur [3, 4], using non-linear probability 
theory.
In essence, the model is as follows. Two new technologies have been 
developed which are about to compete with each other. For example, the market 
for video recorders in the 1980s or the nuclear reactor market in the 1950s. The 
population of potential adopters is assumed to be divided equally in its 
preferences between the two. One group is more likely to choose one technology, 
and the other group its competitor.
The key assumption now is that each of the technologies enjoys increasing 
returns with adoption. The choice of technology by any agent alters the 
probability that all subsequent agents will choose this rather than its rival. It is 
easy to think of reasons why this is the case. For example, with video recorders 
the lead in market share which VHS obtained encouraged retailers to stock tapes 
for these machines rather than for its rival Betamax, which in turn gave an 
incentive for new purchasers to choose a VHS machine.
The final assumption in the technology model is that adopters come 
forward to buy the technologies in a random sequence. As a theorem, in such a 
model, no matter how small the change in the probabilities following each 
individual adoption, one technology will eventually gain 100 per cent market 
share and its rival will be eliminated. It is not possible to predict in advance 
which technology will succeed, for by construction the outcome is a matter of the 
random process of initial adoption. A technology which in an objective sense was 





























































































The assumption of increasing returns - positive feedback - means that the 
market does not automatically 'know best'. Indeed, Betamax was technically 
superior to its VHS rival; the QWERTY keyboard was deliberately developed 
120 years ago to be inefficient, because the transmission of words by telegraph at 
that time could not cope with a faster input. Yet, because people are trained on 
this keyboard, it has not proved possible for more efficient keyboards to break 
the lock over the market of this inefficient design, despite numerous attempts to 
do so.
The above is a particular example of the more general analytical problem, 
which involves the question of how to exit from a local minimum/maximum in a 
non-linear system when searching for a superior local or even the global 
minimum/maximum. There are many such examples in the social sciences. 
Dasgupta [5] , for example, has recently set out a system of positive feedback 
with lock-in solutions in a model of poverty, population and environmental 
degradation in the Third World.
In such systems, it is known that 'nearest neighbour' strategies, involving a 
series of small movements in the immediate neighbourhood or locality often 
work poorly. These strategies can be thought of in the context of social exclusion 
as a programme of targeted expenditure designed to improve the position of the 
excluded group gradually.
Perhaps the best way to think of the problem is geometrically, visualising 
it in three dimensions. A surface exists with many peaks and troughs. The map of 
the surface which we have is incomplete, for in contrast to the assumptions of 
orthodox economics, either we have incomplete information or we lack the 
ability to process efficiently all the information which we have. The task is to 
move out of a local minimum to a local maximum. In other words, from a trough 
to a peak.
Intuitively, if the topology is in some sense well-behaved - rolling hills 
rather than sharp peaks and deep valleys - a 'nearest neighbour' strategy might 
work quite well. Even with imperfect knowledge of the terrain, a series of small 
moves may well succeed in taking us towards the top of a hill. But in a terrain 
with sharp peaks and valleys, such a strategy has only a low chance of success.
The two topographies can be thought of as representing the two types of 
model discussed above, namely a model in which increasing retums/positive 





























































































Unemployement and Social Exclusion: An Economic View
If the terrain is rugged, the conventional response of spending money or 
subsidising the excluded in some way may well not work very well at all. The 
trough which they are in is fairly steep and deep, so even a large effort to get 
them out may simply result in them rolling back down again. Or, even worse, our 
imperfect knowledge of the terrain may lead them to fall into an even deeper, 
unexpected trough.
The prevalence of increasing returns in capitalist economies can be seen 
by asking the question: when a shock to the system takes place and 
unemployment rises, why do not the newly unemployed simply set up production 
on their own account at the prevailing wage rate? If they were able to this, Say's 
law would operate, with supply creating its own demand, and an underemployed 
equilibrium could not persist.
At the micro-level, the existence of increasing returns to production is an 
important reason why such behaviour is not widely observed. (Weitzman [6]). 
Whilst it may well be possible for a skilled professional such as a lawyer or 
accountant to set up on his or her own account with a minimum of capital outlay, 
it is not open to a steel worker or miner, say, to operate in the same way because 
of increasing returns to production. Even where small scale production might be 
technically feasible, imperfect capital markets often prevent individuals from 
borrowing the amount needed to set up production, which is simply another 
manifestation of increasing returns.
The existence of increasing returns to production is a necessary condition 
for the persistence of high unemployment. An implication of this is that policies 
which address explicitly the inability of the unemployed to produce on their own 
account - for example, assistance to SMEs - may help. But in general, a 
permanent and substantial reduction in unemployment will require an increase in 
employment in existing organisations.
4. Growth and unemployment
The idea that higher rates of economic growth are a solution to 
unemployment permeates policy thinking within the European Union, both at a 
national and EU level. A higher rate of growth, it is argued, will increase 
employment, mainly in existing companies, and hence reduce unemployment. 
There are disagreements as to whether this is best achieved by policies of 
demand management or by the newly-fashionable supply side polices, and there 





























































































higher growth is seen as an important contributor to the problem of European 
unemployment.
Prima facie there is apparently a strong relationship between growth and 
employment/unemployment. During the course of any particular economic cycle, 
there is usually a strong correlation between changes in output and changes in 
employment and unemployment.
But the connection between movements in output and employment over 
the course of the economic cycle misleads people into believing that this 
relationship necessarily persists over the course of several cycles. In most 
European countries, the proceeds of economic growth in the past twenty years 
have not been used to generate new jobs (in net terms), but have been 
appropriated by those who have remained in employment. More precisely, a 
system of social relationships has arisen which has allowed the appropriation to 
take place.
Spain provides the most striking example of this. Since 1970, in real terms 
the Spanish economy has essentially doubled in size. Yet employment is actually 
lower now than it was over twenty years ago. More generally, the output of most 
Western European economies has increased by around three-quarters over the 
past twenty years, yet the percentage increase in net employment can be 
measured in single figures.
The lack of connection between output growth and the labour market 
extends to unemployment as well. The growth rate in many Western economies 
from the late 1970s, once the initial impact of the oil price shock had been 
absorbed, has been very similar, at around 2 per cent a year on average. Yet 
against the background of similar growth rates over a period of some fifteen 
years, unemployment rates vary substantially across countries.
France, (West) Germany, Italy, Austria and Spain have all grown at an 
average annual rate of around two and a quarter per cent in the past fifteen years. 
Yet unemployment has averaged 9 per cent in France, 6 per cent in Germany, 9 
per cent in Italy, only 3 per cent in Austria and 16 per cent in Spain. Britain, 
Sweden and Switzerland - countries with governments of quite diverse attitudes 
to economic policy - all grew at just under two per cent over the same period. 
Unemployment averaged 9 per cent in Britain, almost 3 per cent in Sweden and 
less than 1 per cent in Switzerland.
The experience of the twenty-odd years following the Second World War 




























































































Unemployement and Social Exclusion: An Economic View
about low unemployment. During this period, growth was higher and 
unemployment lower than the two decades following the 1973/74 oil shock. But 
even in the earlier period, low unemployment was preserved with markedly 
different growth rates. In both Germany and Britain unemployment averaged 
around 2 per cent, but growth in Germany averaged over 5 per cent compared to 
just under 3 per cent in Britain. Whilst, despite an average growth rate of 3.5 per 
cent, American unemployment averaged almost 5 per cent.
The share of wages in national income (broadly defined to include, for 
example, employers' contributions to public and private pension schemes) in the 
main European economies is very similar in the first half of the 1990s to its value 
in the early 1970s. In Britain and the Netherlands it has fallen slightly, but in 
France, Italy, Germany and Belgium the wage share is almost identical in the two 
periods. Employment has risen very little in percentage terms, and 
unemployment has increased sharply. In other words, the average real wage of 
those in employment has gone up broadly in line with the growth in real GDP. 
Those in work have appropriated the benefits of growth, whilst the unemployed 
have been excluded.
5. Unemployment: a distributional phenomenon
In terms of our model of social exclusion, we can think of the European 
experience as follows. A system of social and economic relationships has been 
built up which strongly reinforces the micro-economic basis of exclusion through 
increasing returns discussed above. A potential way of overcoming this and of 
changing the topography of the system is discussed below.
The main point addressed in this section, however, is the proposition that 
unemployment is essentially a distributional phenomenon. In other words, the 
average rate of unemployment which prevails over the course of the business 
cycle is a result of the particular form of social contract, whether explicit or 
implicit, which exists. Europe in the past twenty years offers but one particular 
outcome, one particular type of social contract, from a wide variety of 
possibilities. The aggregate model of Goodwin [7] offers a wide range of 
possibilities as to why the unemployed may remain locked out. Goodwin’s 
original formulation of a system linking profits and unemployment has been 
extended mathematically in a number of ways. But an extension of the 
economics of the model illustrates the point.
The long-term rate of growth depends upon the share of investment in total 





























































































turn, investment depends upon the state of long-term expectations and the share 
of profits in national income. Over the course of the cycle, the profit share and 
unemployment interact in the system. But the average rate of unemployment 
around which the limit cycle moves in profit/unemployment space is 
indeterminate.
In other words, in order to sustain a given rate of growth in any given state 
of long-term expectations, a particular share of profits in national income is 
implied. The share of labour is then implied as the residual (in practice, there are 
of course some minor elements in national income in addition to the main ones of 
wages and profits). But the division of labour's share of national income between 
the employed and the unemployed is indeterminate. This indeterminacy removes 
any automatic link between output growth and employment, and is entirely 
consistent with the empirical evidence discussed above.
The North American experience during the past twenty years has been 
different from that of Europe. Unemployment in the United States has averaged 
just under 7 per cent over this period. This is slightly higher than the German 
average, and distinctly higher than in a number of the smaller European countries 
which remained outside the EU. At the present time, unemployment in America 
is markedly lower than it is in major European countries such as France, but in 
terms of unemployment in the past twenty years, the American labour market has 
not performed that much more effectively than have such markets in Europe.
But there has been a dramatic difference in the rate of job creation in the 
United States. And it is this which raises issues in Europe about the desirability 
or otherwise of deregulating labour markets and reducing the level of 
involvement by the state. Much of the conventional wisdom of economics 
ascribes the apparently poor European performance to a lack of 'flexibility' in the 
labour market.
The American economy has indeed created many more jobs than the EU 
economies. But it has needed to do so, for the supply of labour has expanded 
more rapidly in the United States. The two points are linked analytically. 
Essentially, the US operates a policy of open borders for the migration of labour. 
From time to time political pressures arise which lead to efforts of varying 
degrees to keep immigrants out. But for all practical purposes, anyone who 
wishes to enter the US and work there can do so.
Almost all of this inflow of labour is from Third World economies - the 
US has a major border with Mexico. Such people are willing to work for what 




























































































Unemployemcnt and Social Exclusion: An Economic View
which makes up much of the increase in employment in America. The 
willingness to work for low wages drives down the wages elsewhere in the 
economy of the relatively unskilled.
The supply of millions of workers from Third World countries has an 
impact on the 'flexibility' of the labour market in the US which makes arguments 
about the Social Chapter in Europe very much a second order issue. By far the 
most effective way to bring about flexibility in the American sense in European 
labour markets would be to open the borders to migration from Eastern Europe 
and North Africa. But such a policy hardly commends itself, least of all, 
ironically, to those politicians who speak most fervently in support of flexibility 
and free markets.
American labour markets of the past fifteen to twenty years offer one 
particular solution to the distribution of labour's share of national income. By 
driving down the wage rates of substantial sections of the labour force, 
employment opportunities are created. But this approach necessitates a dramatic 
widening of the distribution of income. Unemployment is kept relatively low, 
and the distributional consequences are carried by those whose real wage rates 
are forced down. As in Europe, the share of wages in national income is now 
very similar to the levels of the early 1970s. But in America, employment has 
increased substantially.
The topography of the economic system, with its inherent tendency to lock 
out the unemployed, has been altered in the United States by the application of 
powerful market forces. The change has not taken place with the consent of the 
included, but they have been compelled to alter their behaviour.
The Scandinavian economies have, until very recently, offered yet another 
answer to the distributional question. Public expenditure and taxation have been 
used, not in a Keynesian short-term sense, but structurally to allow the public 
sector to operate as an employer of last resort. Adverse shocks to the system are 
met by job creation in the public sector. The distributional costs here are met, in 
an open and explicit social contract, by those in employment who pay higher 
taxes than they would otherwise have done. Growing resistance to higher tax 
rates coupled with shocks particular to these economies (in Finland, the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and in Sweden the collapse of the banking system following 
the abolition of exchange controls) have caused problems for this approach. But 
the opposition to paying tax is not a matter of technical economic policy, but a 





























































































Yet another solution has been provided by Japan. There are a number of 
dimensions to this, the most important of which is the very low productivity 
levels of the domestic service sector in Japan. Large numbers of people are 
employed, at decent wage rates, carrying out tasks which to Westerners often 
appear incomprehensible. But although the economic productivity of the sector is 
low, its social productivity is high in the important sense that unemployment is 
kept low and social cohesion preserved. The costs in this case are met by 
Japanese consumers, who pay much higher prices for services than they would 
do if the sector were run on grounds of narrow economic efficiency alone.
The final model to mention is that of the West in general in the twenty five 
years or so following the Second World War. Economic prosperity grew 
dramatically, but in a framework in which the benefits were spread equally. The 
low skilled were not excluded from employment, and real wages rose at 
approximately similar rates across the income distribution. The specific historical 
background of the privations of the 1930s followed by the co-operative spirit of 
the war were obviously very important in allowing the model to operate 
successfully. As the impact of these values faded over time, America moved to a 
different answer to the distributional question - forcing down real wage rates - 
and Europe to another, namely the social exclusion of the unemployed.
The above three examples, whilst seemingly disparate in a number of 
respects, are in an analytical sense very similar. In terms of the geometric 
representation of our general model of social exclusion, we can think of the 
landscape as being one of gentle, rolling hills rather than the forbidding terrain of 
Europe in the past twenty years. The socially included behaved in such a way as 
to facilitate the absorption of the less skilled and potentially unemployed 
members of society. In different ways, the included accepted the costs of such 
behaviour.
6. European unemployment: a way forward
Whatever solutions to the problem of unemployment might have worked 
in different countries or at different times, it is not really meaningful as a policy 
prescription to think of borrowing or transferring social and cultural values. In 
particular, no amount of nostalgia can restore the past.
One way of creating jobs in Europe has already been noted. Namely, by 
opening the borders to immigration from the poor countries which surround the 




























































































Unemployement and Social Exclusion: An Economic View
as the American experience shows, brings with it a different set of exclusion 
problems arising from the associated widening of the distribution of income.
Thoughtful ways of assisting SMEs, and particularly assisting the 
unemployed to set up production on their own account, can help overcome the 
impact of increasing returns and the inherent tendency for unemployment to 
persist. But, even if successful, such policies would not be suitable for everyone.
The central issue is that the employed in Europe need to be given 
incentives to later their behaviour in a way which facilitates the re-entry of the 
unemployed to employment, rather than operating as a cartel and re-inforcing the 
micro-economic tendency to lock-out.
One such possibility is given by work sharing, using the phrase to 
encompass a wide range of options from literal sharing of a job by two people, to 
reductions in the total number of hours supplied by a worker over his or her 
lifetime, whether in the form of a shorter working life, longer holidays or a 
shorter working week. Of course, this must be accompanied by pro rata 
reductions in pay. But this is matched by an increase in leisure time. An explicit 
trade-off is made between work and leisure.
The idea of work sharing is attacked by economists on the grounds that the 
idea is derived from the lump of labour fallacy, from the mistaken idea that there 
is only a fixed number of jobs available. But on the contrary, the number of jobs 
can grow over time, as the stylised model of capitalism set out in section 5 above 
allows. It is not the number of jobs which is fixed, but the share of labour in 
national income (for any given growth rate, institutions and expectations). The 
growing real value of this share can be taken up entirely by those in employment, 
leaving the number of jobs constant, or, at the other extreme, entirely by new jobs 
leaving the level of real wages constant.
Keynes considered the question of worksharing as a solution to the 
unemployment of the 1930s in a little-remembered section of the General 
Theory. He rejected the idea, but only on the grounds that 'A point comes where 
every individual weighs the advantages of increased leisure against increased 
income. But at present the evidence is, I think, strong that the great majority of 
individuals would prefer increased income to increased leisure'. In other words, 
Keynes' only objection was that at the levels of income which obtained in the 
1930s, the solution was 'premature'.
It is now nearly sixty years since the publication of the General Theory, 





























































































most recent thirty-odd years, is the enormous appetite for increased leisure over 
the course of a working lifetime which people in the West have shown. In the 
memory of many people alive today, a working life consisted of what may be 
termed 'the three Fifties'. Almost everyone left school at 14 or 15, and was 
expected to work into their sixties, or for some fifty years. The working week 
was typically close to fifty hours a week. And people worked for fifty weeks a 
year, with just two weeks of holiday.
Today, a large and rising number of young people remain in full-time 
education until their early twenties, and many people retire well before the 
statutory retirement age. For most of the population, the expected number of 
years in a working life has fallen to under forty. In terms of hours per week, the 
majority of full-time employees work under forty hours a week. And whilst 
holiday entitlement has not yet increased so markedly as to ensure less than forty 
weeks a year at work - except for a small number of privileged groups - many 
workers now take five or six weeks' total holiday a year.
Under the regime of the 'three Fifties', just a few decades ago, the average 
worker who remained in full-time work throughout his or her lifetime would 
work for (50 x 50 x 50) = 125,000 hours during a lifetime. Even for a 'full-time' 
worker, in the mid-1990s this figure has fallen to some 65 -70,000 hours. In other 
words, during the second half of our century alone, the amount of work which a 
'full-time' worker is expected to do in the course of a lifetime has fallen by almost 
a half.
So, iri an important sense, by the standards of the 1930s and 1940s, almost 
every single worker today is part-time rather than full-time, and worksharing in 
its general sense is already both highly popular and practised very widely. As the 
economy grows and productivity rises, those in employment can take the benefits 
in two ways. At one extreme, all the increase is received in the form of a higher 
level of real income. At the other, real income can be kept constant, and the 
benefit taken in the form of doing less work for this level of income. In practice, 
of course, a mixture of the two occurs.
As a broad approximation, in the first half of the twentieth century, at the 
low levels of real income which prevailed, most of the benefits of growth were 
seen in the form of increases in real income rather than of leisure. In the second 
half, a much greater proportion of the total surplus generated by growth has been 
taken in the form of more leisure.
In short, during the past forty years, most people have expressed a clear 




























































































Unemployement and Social Exclusion: An Economic View
levels of real income which prevail in Europe, many people prefer to take a 
substantial proportion of the benefits created by higher productivity in the form 
of more leisure time.
The policy of work sharing simply articulates this clearly expressed 
consumer preference, and endeavours to use it positively to reduce 
unemployment. It is difficult to legislate specifically to restrict hours, increase 
holidays or whatever. To succeed, such moves must command the underlying 
support of the workforce. But governments can encourage such shifts in a variety 
of ways. Gregg [8], for example, argues for a marginal employment subsidy 
combined with a shorter working week, so that employers received for a limited 
period a proportion of the wages of any job created from hours released.
In Britain, a very successful policy to reduce unemployment by increasing 
leisure time was actually implemented by the government in the early 1980s, 
known as the Job Release Scheme. For a short time, anyone certified as suffering 
from a disability could retire early on full benefits, provided that his or her 
employer took on an unemployed person, not necessarily to fill the same 
position, but anywhere in the organisation. In the areas of high unemployment, 
doctors were only too willing to assist, and certified people with the most minor 
disabilities as being unfit for work. This in a sense was the undoing of the 
scheme, in that the government came to believe that skilled workers who were 
perfectly capable of work were retiring early, and that this was not the intention. 
But while it lasted, it was both very popular with the beneficiaries and very 
effective.
But, although work sharing in its broad sense is the clearly revealed 
preference of most of the workforce, active measures to promote it are often 
resisted. The apparent paradox between the clear desire to have more leisure time 
and the resistance to proposals to encourage this, is perhaps understandable in the 
climate of uncertainty which has been created in recent years. There are two 
dimensions to this. First, the fact that a switch away from work towards leisure 
may involve not just a loss of income but a loss of rights. Second, the speed of 
technological innovation combined with a new culture of management mean that 
there is a high level of worry about losing one's job completely, and so 
individuals have an incentive to extract as much money from it as they can in the 
short-run.
It is hardly surprising that, in such circumstances, it is difficult to create a 
climate in which co-operative solutions to unemployment can prevail. But it is 
essential that they do, for a system of economic relationships has been built up in 





























































































general social fabric to major economic shocks, which now prevents the 
achievement of full employment through conventional economic policies, 
whether Keynesian, monetarist, or supply-side.
7. Conclusion
Unemployment can be thought of as a very important but nevertheless 
special case of the more general phenomenon of social exclusion. Three stylised 
facts characterise exclusion. First, the tendency for exclusion, once it arises, to 
persist for long periods of time. Second, self-equilibrating mechanisms appear to 
be weak or non-existent. Third, policies targeted at excluded groups have a long 
history of failure. Unemployment itself exhibits all these factors.
Mathematically, this can be thought of as a non-linear system in which 
positive feedback takes place. This latter term is used not in a normative sense, 
but in its technical sense of meaning that the dynamic processes at work re­
inforce each other. The system becomes locked into a particular solution, from 
which it is difficult to exit.
'Nearest neighbour' strategies, which involve relatively small steps in the 
immediate locality of the solution path to try to escape from it, are known not to 
be very effective. This result accounts for the fact that many conventional 
policies of targeting expenditure on excluded groups to improve their position 
gradually have not really succeeded.
An illustration of this is macro-economic policy, whether of a Keynesian 
or monetarist kind. In general, such policies merely alter the shape of the 
particular cycle of unemployment and do not shift the average rate of 
unemployment around which such cycles take place.
The current widespread belief that higher rates of economic growth will 
reduce unemployment often fails to make the distinction between fluctuations in 
the growth rate around the underlying trend, and the trend itself. But even if this 
latter variable could in some way be increased, there is no guarantee that 
unemployment will be lower in the medium term. In the West in general, and 
particularly within Western Europe, there is little or no correlation over the 
course of several economic cycles between the rate of economic growth and 
either the growth of employment or the average rate of unemployment.
Unemployment is essentially a distributional question. For any given set of 





























































































Unemployement and Social Exclusion: An Economic View
particular share of profits in national income for it to be sustained. In the medium 
term, this implies a particular share of wages, defined in a broad sense, in 
national income. But the share of this latter factor either between the employed or 
between the employed and unemployed is not related to the underlying rate of 
economic growth.
A variety of empirical solutions can be observed to the share of labour in 
national income. In Western Europe in the past twenty years, the proceeds of 
economic growth have been appropriated by those in employment, to the 
exclusion of the unemployed. Any permanent solution to unemployment requires 
a change in behaviour by the employed. In terms of the general model of social 
exclusion, this can be thought of as altering the topography of the system, by 
modifying those forces which lead to lock-in and exclusion.
One such policy is that of work sharing, using the phrase to encompass a 
wide range of options and not just literally the sharing of a job by two people. 
The past forty years have seen a massive increase in effective job sharing, with 
the number of hours which an individual can expect to work during the course of 
his or her lifetime falling by a half. By the standards of the 1930s, almost 
everyone in employment today is a part-time worker. This trend of increased 
leisure over a lifetime is very popular but, paradoxically, explicit measures to 
promote various forms of sharing work are often resisted by the labour force. 
The challenge facing Europe's politicians is to find ways of overcoming such 
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